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Abstract 
 
This article begins with a conceptualisation, in legal-pluralist and agency-oriented terms, of the 
legal implications of the Bangladeshi presence in Britain. It then examines how immigration 
restrictions, introduced particularly in the 1980s, were aimed at preventing the settlement of 
Bangladeshis. There is then discussion of how some concrete legal problems have been 
considered in actual court decisions. The article thereby considers the extent to which English 
law maintains a largely ethno-centrist perspective vis-à-vis the Bangladeshi presence.  
 
 
1. The interplay of legal systems, or Bangladeshi legal pluralism  
 
Much of the explanation as to why the Bangladeshi presence in Britain has hardly made a 
dent in British legal consciousness lies with the nature of, and presuppositions that 
operate within that system. What are these factors then? First, one can point to the 
predominant fiction that the state’s law is at the centre of things and is able to control 
and police all aspects of social life within any of the communities that make up 
contemporary Britain. This ideology is consistent with what John Griffiths (1986) calls 
‘legal centralism’. It is the belief that all normative orders can be displaced by the state’s 
legal system which then becomes the sole governing factor in legal terms. Whatever is 
not recognised or stipulated by state law is considered legally irrelevant and therefore not 
a concern for lawyers or legal academics. Such assumptions are common to Western 
legal systems that are predicated on the superiority of state-sanctioned law. The ‘official’ 
(Chiba 1986) British state law thus presents itself very much as the ‘dominant’ (Hooker 
1975) legal system. 
 Secondly, the problems presented by legal centralism are compounded by its 
combination with ethno-centrism within the legal system and among its ideologues. 
Thus, not only is the state law considered the only relevant regulatory factor, but also it is 
not seen as necessary for the state to respond with equidistance to all the communities 
that make up its population. There are clear cultural biases that inform law-making and 
that are also strongly inclined to displace the influence of non-Christian, non-Western 
normative systems. The state legal system is largely seen as the property of only some of 
its social components. A situation of repression (Glenn 2000: 50-53) of other legal orders 
is therefore in place at all levels, despite a rhetorical recognition by government officers 
that Britain today is a multicultural society. The fact of a plural social base is not deemed 
to require the pluralisation of the official legal system. Rather, there remains the 
expectation that various ‘others’ must assimilate to the norms of the majority as a 
condition of legal protection. Thus, the state law presents a system of ‘ethnic penalties’ 
(Modood and Berthoud 1997: 144-145), such that the more ‘ethnic’ one is seen to be, the 
more the likelihood of marginalisation or penalisation. 
Bangladeshis obviously don’t just follow English law upon arrival in Britain, and 
much less so do they follow English law in Bangladesh, as proponents of the common 
law’s triumph over non-Western legal cultures would have it. We actually do not know as 
much as we should about the legal system of Bangladesh. However, its basic set up 
seems to resemble other South Asian legal systems, with which it also shares a common 
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history in several ways (Monsoor 1999: 59-120). A key point for us is that the state is 
actually a relatively distant phenomenon in psychological terms. It is modelled on the 
Asian (and African) paradigm of a ‘soft state’ which, while formally superior, is not 
interested in dictating the terms of everyday life and law for most people (Menski 2000: 
11). We might best describe this scenario as one of assisted self-control, in that the 
primary regulating factor is the society and its sub-units, but not the state. This model, 
with ancient roots in South Asia (Mistry 1999, Menski 2000: 149-172), is definitely not 
like the Western state system with its legal-centralist underpinnings.  
Another key distinguishing feature is the place of personal laws in South Asian 
legal systems. Thus we find that it is officially recognised that different religious or tribal 
communities will follow their personal law systems in matters of family, property and 
religion - accordingly the state gets involved in administering Muslim law, Hindu law, and 
so on. This is a pre-colonial fact, recognised by the colonial Indian state in its own 
peculiar way, and it continues to inform the basic modus operandi of legal systems all over 
South Asia today. However, in Bangladesh this system has come under tension with the 
twin drives for ‘Islamisation’ and uniformisation (Menski and Rahman 1988, Menski 
1997: 18-23). It would still appear though that, in contrast to the Western model, South 
Asian legal systems allow a wide scope for the operation of personal law systems, as well 
as facilitating their official recognition. These differences in understanding about the 
place of the state in the context of its social framework have a crucial role to play in 
conceptualising the transplantation of Bangladeshi legal culture in Britain, and they are 
arguably key determinants in its cognitive interaction with English law.  
With migration to Britain one can expect that legal patterns that are followed at 
the personal level are continued unless we make the very unsound assumption that all 
one’s cultural baggage gets lost on the flight to Britain! We therefore find that there is a 
transplantation of Bangladeshi, predominantly Sylheti legal culture to the bideshi setting. 
With the earlier stages of male dominated migration from Bangladesh some bideshi habits 
may have been adopted and there is some evidence in the reported cases that some of 
these men had got into relationships with local white women. However, with the arrival 
of families in more recent decades we will probably have seen the hardening of societal 
strictures in all sorts of ways (Ballard 1994: 14-18). We will therefore see quite different 
stages of legal reconstruction and inter-action on the road to the establishment of desh 
bidesh, to adapt Ballard’s (1994) formulation, desh pardesh (see already Gardner 1993).  
 At this stage, it is worth emphasising that theorising and fieldwork about the 
ethnic minority presence in the UK have already moved on despite official dogmas about 
the respective place of state and society as well as inherent cultural biases. Thus we 
already have some material that argues for the recreation of South Asian legal cultures in 
diasporic contexts (chiefly, Menski 1993). For Bangladeshis the material on Muslim law, 
or ‘angrezi shariat’ (Pearl and Menski 1998, Menski 2001) is most relevant, given the 
overwhelming concentration of Muslims among this group. The concept of angrezi 
shariat, an Urdu term meaning British Muslim law (ingreji shoriyot in Bangla/Sylheti), is 
understood as the Muslim legal cultures recreated within the British setting.  
I do not see this as the introduction of the textual or doctrinal shari’a, even 
though attention generally tends to focus on this due to prevailing ideological 
predispositions. It should rather be seen as the more or less conscious process of 
developing a living law in the diaspora. Thus it is that Ballard (n.d.) argues for greater 
attention to be paid, not to the concepts of the doctrinal shari’a, but to everyday notions 
of rivaz (rewaj in Bangla/Sylheti) on which maintenance of honour is crucially predicated. 
This should incorporate the elements of ‘Hindu’ custom and the female-centred ritual 
order, apparently very strong in the Bangladeshi setting (Gardner 1995, Monsoor 1999: 
48-51), though tending nowadays to be dismissed as a mere ‘cultural’ artefact by trendy 
2
 
young Muslim students in Britain in their avowedly increasing commitment to Islam 
(Gardner and Shukur 1994: 161-163, Ballard 2001a). It could also incorporate 
adaptations to English legal requirements such as the registration of marriages. A 
thoroughly hybrid process is therefore presented and it is evident that all Muslim 
communities have been engaged in this process to some degree, the Sylhetis no less. 
Because this process is a dynamic one (Yilmaz 1999) it means that actual fieldwork 
knowledge is required to appreciate how the cultures in the country of origin have 
adapted to their new setting. Ethnographers, and sometimes even lawyers in practice, are 
better placed here than legal academics it seems.  
 What is the status of this emergent Muslim law then? While there were demands 
in the 1970s from Muslim spokesmen that the state recognise shari’a officially, these 
demands have not been met (Poulter 1990). Muslims have also been campaigning for 
recognition under the anti-discrimination and blasphemy laws, but these more limited 
demands have also been pushed away by a state that has been making confident strides 
towards secularism for decades now. This form of secularism is not the Indian form of 
equidistance to all faiths but, drawing on liberal answers to intra-European religious 
conflicts, demands the ‘privatisation’ of religion. Some concessions, particularly at local 
level (Nielsen 1988, 1992, Shah 1994) on issues such as education, mosque building and 
slaughter regulations are granted, however, and this probably remains the most viable 
strategy for obtaining recognition at present (Yilmaz 2000). According to the 
classification that we met earlier therefore, Muslim law, whether in doctrinal form, or - 
much more relevant - in the sense of a living legal system has been pushed firmly into the 
‘unofficial’ sphere. There is not much likelihood that this general position will change in 
the near future given serious, and no doubt culturally-loaded reservations in the West 
about the compatibility of Muslim laws with human rights norms (Poulter 1990, 1998). 
The Muslim response meanwhile seems to have turned to the development of dispute 
resolution fora as a parallel non-state court system that demonstratively illustrates that 
the English legal system offers inadequate protective mechanisms (Badawi 1995, Carroll 
1997, Pearl and Menski 1998: 77-80, 393-398, Shah-Kazemi 2001, Yilmaz 2001).  
 
 
2. Immigration restrictions: preventing the establishment of desh bidesh 
 
Before going on to examine some of the recent, almost contemporaneously decided 
cases, it is may be useful to examine the immigration law response to the prospect of 
Bangladeshi settlement in Britain. The immigration system is, after all, where much of the 
legal encounter between Bangladeshis and the English law has been taking place in the 
last two decades. The reasons are obvious to ethnographers who have noticed that the 
establishment of desh bidesh, and thus the regrouping of families in Britain, took place at a 
later stage for Sylhetis than it did for the other South Asian groups from India or 
Pakistan. There was thus a shift from the men’s ‘international commuter’ lifestyle to the 
arrival of wives and children from the 1970s, peaking in the 1980s, but continuing 
through the 1990s (Ballard 1994: 20, Gardner and Shukur 1994: 150, Gardner 1995: 114-
121, Eade, Vamplew and Peach 1996: 151, Juss 1997: 47-48). If the decision to reunite 
families was at least in part motivated by a strategy to avoid waiting for a time when 
controls would get even stricter, as Gardner and Shukur (1994: 150) indicate, the 
immigration law system had, by the mid-1980s, fine-tuned its restrictive machinery 
against South Asian settlement such that Bangladeshis found themselves experiencing its 
worst aspects.  
Indeed, from the mid-1980s we find that restrictions were tightened further 
specifically in response to Bangladeshi regrouping in Britain. Thus, in August 1985, the 
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Immigration Rules that spouses and fiancées were required to satisfy before obtaining 
entry clearance were changed so that those applying to enter had to also satisfy the 
authorities that there would be no recourse to public funds (Sachdeva 1993: 93-100). 
This also coincided with the gradually worsening economic position of Bangladeshi men 
because of de-industrialisation in sectors where they were over-represented (Gardner 
1995: 48). Many men could still claim exemption from the application of these 
requirements, however, as they had been working in Britain since before the Immigration 
Act of 1971. A clause had been inserted into this Act guaranteeing Commonwealth men 
who had settled in Britain prior to 1973 that their conditions for family reunion would be 
no worse. The full impact of the Rule changes was therefore not evident immediately.  
A visa requirement imposed in the autumn of 1986 for visitors from Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, India, Ghana and Nigeria effectively came to strictly control travel to Britain, 
and it had its impact even on those dependants with a claim to British citizenship (Joint 
Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 1987, Drabu and Bowen 1989, see further below). 
The most serious attack on Bangladeshi families came about in the Immigration Act of 
1988, however, and Gardner (1995: 48-49) has rightly observed its crucial importance: 
 
‘British Bengali men who did not bring their wives and children to the UK in the 
1970s may now find themselves embroiled in complicated and expensive legal 
wrangling, which may take years to resolve, especially since the Immigration Act 
1988 now means that their dependants are no longer guaranteed entry. Countless 
trips may have to be made to the British High Commission in Dhaka by family 
members in Bangladesh. Sometimes by the time a case is processed, the 
conditions of entry are not longer valid. Many rural Sylhetis, like ordinary people 
in the UK, have only a vague idea of the immigration laws, and none at all of 
their rights. The documentary evidence which is acceptable in British courts 
simply does not exist in rural Bangladesh, for few people know their exact age, let 
alone have a birth certificate to prove it. The skill of a family’s lawyer may well 
tip the scales in deciding who gets their entry and who does not, and it is the 
poorer and less well-connected who inevitably lose out.’ 
 
This Act did away with the above-mentioned guarantee in the 1971 Act thereby allowing 
the subjection of Bangladeshis to the stringent and ever more demanding requirements 
of the Immigration Rules on family reunion. It is therefore no coincidence that a huge 
number of refusals have been made under the public funds criteria since then. This is 
attested to by the fact that public funds cases constitute a large proportion of the load 
dealt with by the Immigration Appeal Tribunal (Gillespie 1992, McKee 1995, Hussein 
and Seddon 1996, Wray and Quayum 1999).  
The 1988 Act also attempted to neutralise another trump card in Bangladeshi 
hands. Many South Asian men, Bangladeshis (formerly East Pakistanis) being the most 
important group here, who came to work in the UK in the earlier periods of post-war 
migration, acquired a right of abode under the ‘patriality’ provisions of the Immigration 
Act 1971. While South Asian men could not generally establish such a right through 
ancestral connections or birth in the UK, many were able to do so after five years 
residence in the UK, or by registering in the UK as citizens of the UK and colonies 
(CUKCs) as Gardner and Shukur (1994: 150) have indicated. Importantly, under the 
patriality provisions such men could also pass a right of abode on to their wives, 
including second wives, and children who therefore enjoyed an unfettered right to enter 
the UK. Further, the children of patrial men who had registered themselves as CUKCs 
became entitled to claim the status of British citizens upon the coming into force of the 
British Nationality Act 1981. They could therefore travel to the UK without the need for 
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certificates of entitlement, even on Bangladesh passports, and without being subject to 
immigration control (see in detail Fransman 1986, Fransman 1989: 210-231). The key 
events that culminated in the 1988 Act being passed again reinforce the impression that 
the main target of control were family members from Bangladesh. Fransman (1989: 215) 
recounts the cumulative effect of the 1986 and 1988 legal changes:  
 
‘The Bangladesh British citizens by descent began to arrive in 1985 and during 
1986 the numbers increased substantially. However, as of 16 October 1986, the 
UK government made Bangladeshis visa nationals. As a matter of law, those 
claiming British citizenship by descent did not require visas but the airlines, 
fearful of financial penalties, simply refused to carry any Bangladesh passport 
holder without a visa. The result was that in all but a few isolated cases the flow 
of claimants from Bangladesh was halted. 
 
‘The government, however, was not satisfied with a mere de facto prevention of 
direct arrivals of claimants of British citizenship by descent. The introduction of 
visas may have placed a hurdle in the path of claimants wishing to travel direct to 
the UK but did not affect their legal right to do so. Accordingly, after the 1987 
election the government announced its intention to amend the law and so to 
extinguish the statutory entitlement.’  
 
Thus, the 1988 Act (in section 3(1)) imposed a requirement on all claimants to the right 
of abode or British citizenship to establish that status by obtaining a certificate of 
entitlement or a British passport when seeking to enter the UK. This provision obviated 
the risk of claimants to entry simply arriving at a British port, and rather attempted to 
ensure that controls were applied at diplomatic posts abroad where any adverse publicity 
could be avoided.   
 The 1988 Act also had specific implications for those in polygamous marriages. 
Some of the earlier immigration case law seems to indicate, at best, an ambivalent official 
attitude to the recognition of polygamous marriages, and a refusal to allow family 
reunion could often result even though the persons involved had always considered 
themselves married under their personal law. The 1988 Act and accompanying 
Immigration Rule changes then introduced a prohibition on the entry of a polygamously 
married wife where another wife had already been admitted to Britain. This can also be 
read as a direct attack on Bangladeshi families as the practice of polygamy seems to be 
have been most prevalent with this group as compared to other South Asians. Although 
not significant in terms of overall numbers, these restrictions were also indicative of the 
fact that the UK legal system was prepared to tolerate the separation of families, and of 
mothers from their children, ironically as a way of signalling its civilisational superiority 
(Shah 2002). As discussed further below such posturing has led to the downgrading of 
the rights of Bangladeshi children too, who are now deemed illegitimate by English law. 
A more general point that can be made about the immigration restrictions is that, not 
only are they aimed at curbing the settlement of Bangladeshis in Britain, but the way in 
which particular legal conflicts are handled shows much evidence of ethno-centrist 
assumptions in full play within English law. This then has its own function in signalling 
to Bangladeshis that assimilation to dominant norm systems is expected.  
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3. Bangladeshis in English law: a case study in legal ethno-centrism 
 
If we take the two elements identified earlier - of state centrism and ethno-centrism - 
together we find that there is ample scope for the dismissal, marginalisation or distortion 
of Bangladeshi legal culture within English legal fora. On the other hand, we can also 
find at least some evidence that English judges cannot escape from having to grapple 
with evidence of Bangladeshi legal reconstruction in Britain despite the official mono-
culturalist policy. Here I want to present evidence from three reported cases to show 
how these patterns work themselves out in concrete situations. All three cases are linked 
to the extent that they all deal with the issue of marriage albeit in different contexts, and 
all three are also, directly or indirectly, concerned with the status of children of the 
marriages. One concerns recognition of a long-standing marriage in the absence of 
evidence of registration or indisputable documentary evidence. The second is concerned 
with the consequences of a polygamous marriage for the status of children. The third, 
which is discussed in a separate section considering the challenging issues it raises, 
concerns the dreaded mixed marriage and the question of renaming and circumcising the 
child once the couple have split up. 
 
 
3.1 Sanctity of marriage or over-reliance on kagzi evidence? 
 
In our first case, R (Shamsun Nahar) v Social Security Commissioners (21 December 2001, 
QBD (Admin Ct), [2001] EWHC Admin 1049), the underlying question was whether the 
applicant was entitled to a widow’s pension as the surviving wife of a Bangladeshi man. 
There was some evidence that she had already fought a long legal battle with the 
immigration authorities to obtain a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode on the 
basis of her marriage. Her initial appeal against refusal of a certificate was allowed but 
then, on further appeal by the entry clearance officer, the matter was remitted by the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) to another adjudicator who also allowed the appeal. 
The IAT refused leave to appeal further, and the applicant finally arrived in the UK with 
her son. Throughout the immigration proceedings, the validity of the marriage, which 
had taken place ‘in accordance with Muslim tradition and practice’ in (what was then) 
East Pakistan in 1952, was accepted. Also, a document described as a ‘marriage deed’ had 
been accepted as valid.  
The applicant’s claim for a widow’s pension had already been made while she 
was in Bangladesh and, having been interviewed at the British High Commission in 
Dhaka, her claim was refused by an Adjudication Officer. It was in the social security 
proceedings that the whole question of whether she was married at all was then raised. 
The ‘marriage deed’ was produced before the Social Security Appeal Tribunal on appeal. 
The document was referred to a ‘document examination officer’ within the Department 
of Social Security. He was of the opinion that it was highly unlikely that the marriage 
deed was actually issued in 1952. Munby J’s judgment then sets out what followed: 
 
‘On 27 February 1998 the Social Security Appeal Tribunal refused the claimant’s 
appeal, having found on the balance of probabilities that it had not been 
established that a valid marriage had been contracted between the [claimant] and 
Abdul Kadir [her deceased husband]. The Tribunal’s full reasons were issued on 
1 June 1998. Referring to the expert’s opinion the Tribunal described the 
marriage deed as suspect. The Tribunal mentioned that the claimant’s solicitor 
had referred to the decision of the [immigration] adjudicator of 22 July 1997 and 
went on to record the presenting officer’s riposte that that decision had been 
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based on the supposed validity of the marriage certificate. The Tribunal 
concluded on the balance of probabilities that the marriage deed was a forgery.’ 
  
The challenge before Munby J then concentrated on the extent to which the social 
security appeals proceedings ought to have followed the findings as to validity in the 
immigration proceedings. It was held that there was no such obligation on them, and the 
judgment is an excellent review of authorities on this and related points. In fact the judge 
held that even when a party has satisfied one government department of the existence of 
a certain relationship, other departments may lawfully reopen the issue of validity.  
The problem that needs to be highlighted here, however, is that it was unhelpful 
for the social security proceedings to have focused on the genuineness or otherwise of 
the ‘marriage deed’, on which the whole effort of establishing validity of the marriage 
seemed to have depended. As seen, the doubts as to the genuineness of the ‘deed’ seem 
to get progressively greater through the social security proceedings. What ought to have 
been revealed at some stage in those proceedings was that marriage laws in South Asia 
are not premised on registration systems; although such systems do exist they are not 
mandatory and informal, customary marriages are invariably recognised. It is common 
practice for people to obtain secondary documentation in order to show that the relevant 
relationship exists when such a need arises. While such documents can never be absolute 
proof that the relationship claimed exists, neither should it have been assumed that if the 
documents were not drafted at the time of the relationship’s coming into being (for 
example at the time of a marriage ceremony) that they are necessarily invalid.  
Munby J did recognise in the judgment that: 
 
‘The claimant thus finds herself in an unenviable and invidious position and, I do 
not doubt, one which seriously affects her standing in and treatment by her 
community. As [her counsel] points out, the effect of the Commissioners’ 
decision is to brand her son M as illegitimate.’ 
 
Despite this acknowledgement, no significant effort seem to have been made to satisfy 
any doubts about the relationships through appropriate means. If validity of the marriage 
was at issue, then there are other rules that could have been used. This must be assumed 
to be more than an isolated case as Pearl and Menski (1998: 171) have commented:  
 
‘In quite a few cases, absence of witnesses or more generally lack of 
documentation of a Muslim marriage entered into in South Asia has been an 
issue for the determination before the British courts and tribunals. While the 
South Asian courts … lean in favour of recognizing such marriages as valid, 
European judges appear to need constant reminders of the existence of a strong 
presumption in favour of marriage in Muslim law.’  
 
Crucially, it does not appear that this was picked up by the lawyers arguing the case and 
they managed to divert the issue by getting the judge to decide on one of the finer points 
of English administrative law. In doing so, they missed the essential issue, as did Munby J 
himself despite recognising that a finding of invalidity would have undesirable 
consequences for the applicant and her son. Not only would the decision leave her worse 
of in financial terms, but English law would also be making allegations of zina (jina in 
Bangla/Sylheti) against her, and leaving the status of her son in question.  
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3.2 Questioning the legitimacy of children 
 
As mentioned above, the English (and Scottish) attitude to the recognition of 
polygamous marriage has long been ambiguous if not altogether hostile. This hostility 
has not been sustainable over the longer term because courts were inevitably placed in a 
position of having to decide on the consequences especially when matrimonial relief was 
sought. In the early post-war decades, the judicial response was pragmatic, but still 
ethno-centric - convert the marriage to a monogamous one mentally and then provide 
the relief. In the early 1970s however legislation was specifically passed to allow courts to 
provide relief in polygamous marriages that had broken down. At the same time, in a 
thoroughly assimilationist move, it was stipulated that no marriage celebrated in England 
and Wales could be polygamous, and the marriages of English domiciled men were void 
if contracted in polygamous form (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 11). English 
law was thus attempting to asset control over non-European men here. Read literally, the 
provisions of this legislation would have meant that those South Asian men who had 
married under Muslim or Hindu law that allowed polygamy were not validly married, 
even if the marriages were actually monogamous.  
 The Court of Appeal (in Hussain v Hussain [1982] 1 All ER 369) stepped in to 
partly remedy this anomaly by holding that, since no English domiciled men were 
capable in law of entering into polygamous marriages, all such marriages were valid. 
However, the effect of the legislation and this case was still that those women married to 
men who were already married could have their marriages treated as invalid under 
English law if their husband was considered as domiciled in England. Thus many actually 
polygamous marriages were treated as such when second or third wives made application 
to enter Britain (Shah 2002). Even though the reforms of the early 1970s were predicated 
on extending the protection of the matrimonial relief laws to polygamously married 
women, the cumulative effect of subsequent developments has been to penalise those 
women by derecognising their marital unions altogether. We have seen above how the 
immigration law positions of such wives declined further.  
However, children of such marriages were still considered legitimate under the 
Legitimacy Act 1976 and thus able to inherit British citizen status from their fathers just 
as described above (Pearl 1986: 48-49). Or so it was thought! The recent decision of the 
Court of Appeal in Azad v ECO, Dhaka (10 May 2001, [2000] WL 1918688 (CA), [2001] 
INLR 109, [2001] Imm AR 318) now puts the whole thing in doubt. The applicant child, 
born in Bangladesh in 1984, was a son by a third wife. An application was made for a 
certificate of entitlement to the right of abode in the UK on his behalf. It was also 
recognised that this would be a test case for all other children by the father’s second and 
third wives. By the Court of Appeal stage, some matters had already been conceded, 
specifically that the marriage between the applicant’s father and mother was considered 
void under English law, even though valid under Bangladesh law, as the father was 
already domiciled ‘in the United Kingdom’. The father, it was conceded, knew that to be 
so, and so it was the mother’s belief as to validity on which the case would turn. This is 
because s. 1 of the Legitimacy Act 1976 (as amended) provides in the relevant part as 
follows:  
 
‘1 (1) The child of a void marriage, whenever born, shall … be treated as the 
legitimate child of his parents if at the time of the insemination resulting in the 
birth or, where there was no such insemination, the child's conception (or at the 
time of the celebration of the marriage if later) both or either of the parties 
reasonably believed that the marriage was valid. 
… 
8
 
(3) It is hereby declared for the avoidance of doubt that subsection (1) 
above applies notwithstanding that the belief that the marriage was valid was due 
to a mistake as to law.’ 
 
As the Court saw it, the main question was whether the mother’s belief was one as to 
validity under English law or under the lex loci celebrationis, that is, Bangladesh law. In an 
extremely briefly reasoned speech Jacob J, with whom Laws and Kennedy LJJ fully 
agreed, held that the question ought to be whether she had a reasonable belief in the 
validity of the marriage under English law. Jacob J also felt that, as there was no evidence 
as to the mother’s state of mind, no finding could be made as to her belief. He dismissed 
the test in an earlier Tribunal case (Begum, 16 March 1990) in which Prof. Jackson had 
suggested that the Tribunal would be prepared ‘to approach the matter on the basis that 
it would suffice if one parent had no reason to believe that the marriage would be invalid 
in English law’. Given that there was no material from the third wife as to her belief 
about the position under English law, the Tribunal’s decision in the present case was 
upheld.   
 This is an extremely worrying judgment. For observers who are used to decisions 
on South Asian laws being largely driven by immigration concerns it probably does not 
come as much of a surprise. However, it means that decision makers are now able to 
refuse citizenship to children of polygamously married parents on the basis of a belief 
about validity under English law that was held by either spouse even though that 
marriage was considered legal in the place where is was performed and, crucially, under 
the personal laws of the parties concerned. Further, the decision on citizenship rests on an 
initial finding of illegitimacy that would have thoroughly offensive overtones to a 
significant number of communities (not only Bangladeshis) now settled in Britain. Not 
only may it already be considered offensive enough that English law does not respect 
polygamous arrangements allowed under the laws of large sections of the world’s 
population, but it may not go unnoticed that English law is so easily prepared to declare 
children of such unions illegitimate.  
That such law can be created by judicial fiat in an extremely short judgment and 
with a reasoned speech made by only one judge, is a further sign that immigration 
concerns are now creating a private international law that seems to have lost all 
perspective. Where is this trend now likely to stop? If one is prepared extrapolate on the 
basis of this judgment, are we also to treat as illegitimate children of second marriages 
that take place after a first marriage has been dissolved by an extra-judicial divorce? Even 
though recognised under other legal systems, it is certainly the case that such divorces are 
routinely being de-recognised by UK decision makers who are supported in this by case 
law from the highest courts (Pearl and Menski 1998: 382-398, Jones and Welhengama 
2000: 118-132, Mayss 2000). As seen in the Shamsun Nahar case (above), there are even 
cases where English law has trouble recognising first marriages where no official element 
of registration is involved. The fact that most legal systems in the world are happy to 
continue recognising such marriages does not seem to make a difference in English law, 
however. Rather, in the face of increasing social pluralism, English law seems again to 
retreat further into an ethno-centric posture.  
 
 
4. Towards a Bangla-Anglian law? 
 
The third, and in some respects a path-breaking case, is Re S (Change of names: cultural 
factors) (15 May 2001, [2001] 2 FLR 1005) decided in the family division of the High 
Court. Although Wilson J’s judgment really deserves an article by itself, I will restrict 
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myself here to remarking on what I see as its most significant aspects. The case involves 
a Bangladeshi Muslim girl who had arrived in the UK in 1990 from Bangladesh, was now 
22 years old and a British citizen. She had eloped with her child’s father, now 28 years 
old, who was Sikh by ‘religion and culture’, and an Indian national who had obtained 
indefinite leave to remain by virtue of marriage to the mother. They had got married 
when she was 17 and he 22, and she thereby became ostracised by her parents and 
brother, having only minimal contact with her family through her younger sister. In time, 
the marriage broke down, the father of their child applied for a contact order from the 
court. The mother made a cross application to resist that and also to have the child’s 
three Sikh names changed so that he would be accepted by her natal family, with whom 
she had now become reconciled, and her community.  
 In the event, the judge refused to grant permission for the child’s names to be 
changed by deed poll, stating that the child should continue to be aware of the Sikh part 
of his identity and that should he wish to have his names changed officially then he could 
do so when he came of age. The judge did, however, allow the mother to continue to use 
a Muslim name for him, including registration with the school and medical and dental 
practices. The judge decided that the child should be brought up as a Muslim since it was 
impractical for him to be brought up as a Sikh at the same time, although he observed 
that this did not preclude him being encouraged to respect the Sikh faith. He therefore 
accepted that the child could be circumcised. He finally ordered that contact by the 
father should be maintained at a contact centre twice a year.  
While these overall conclusions by the judge could obviously be discussed 
further, what makes the case especially stand out is the lengths that he goes to use the 
cultural backdrop, particularly as concerns the mother, to arrive at the end result. Indeed, 
he starts off by remarking that:  
 
‘It is difficult for a white judge to understand, let alone to articulate, the depth of 
the shock which the mother’s family suffered and of the shame which she 
brought upon it, as well as upon herself, by running away with and marrying a 
Sikh man.   
 
This is a rare example of a white judge admitting in effect that his cultural distance prevents 
him from deciding the issues in the case alone. In fact, he goes on to credit the assistance 
of the lawyers in the case both of who seemed, judging by their names, to be South 
Asian Muslims, if not Bangladeshis, as well as the benefit of reports by experts on ‘Indian 
[sic] law, culture and religion’, who had been employed by either side.  
This passage is also but one illustration of the judge’s treatment of the mother’s 
position and conduct through the proceedings as being intimately linked to her status in 
her family and in her wider community. In other words, the judgment shows some 
awareness throughout that whatever decision was made had to be seen, not from an 
individualistic perspective, but must take into account the mother’s and her child’s future 
chances of successfully maintaining their social position in their wider context, even 
though this had been obviously affected somewhat by the mother’s history. Wilson J thus 
refers to her having transgressed the taboo against having sexual relations outside 
marriage, and that too with a non-Muslim man; that her portrayal of the father’s 
behaviour towards her was at least partly motivated to assist in her own reconciliation 
with her family; and that she could still aim for remarriage within her community.  
In several places in the judgment there are references to the fact of this 
community context. The judge thus also refers to the ‘East London Muslim community’, 
‘the Muslim community’ and ‘the East London Bangladeshi community’. The very 
localised nature of the mother and her child’s social context also seems to be recognised 
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by specific references to the East London setting. Is this actual judicial recognition of 
the fact that different localities are now influenced by particular South Asian legal 
cultures? Is it possible to argue that this is also official recognition of the fact of legal 
reconstruction, of a ‘translocal’ (Ballard 2001b), legal desh bidesh? Certainly, Menski (1988: 
11, 1993: 262, Pearl and Menski 1998: 59-61) has observed that patterns of local 
concentration have their particular significance for legal reconstruction. It is thus 
certainly possible to argue that judges cannot escape the relevance of local knowledge 
and developments and that this judgment shows a proactive taking-on-board of such 
phenomena. If we are saying that ‘law’ is anyway much more about lived cultures, rather 
than just positivist dictats ‘from above’, then the idea should not be so hard to grasp. It is 
thus certainly possible to argue that there is a potential for seeing a movement from the 
‘unofficial’ to the ‘official’ levels here.  
On the other hand, the precise manner in which this is done also carries its own 
dangers. In reading the case, one must wonder whether the points about Muslim law and 
religion are played up particularly because of the influence of Muslim lawyers on either 
side. One of my Bangladeshi students remarked upon reading the case that in his view 
the way in which Islam was portrayed reflects a ‘white’ perspective, even though one of 
the experts is an Arab specialised on Middle East affairs. But there must certainly be 
room here for arguing that the portrayal of religious or ethnic identity can appear as a 
caricature to the extent that it does not really represent the lived reality for the people 
concerned.  
Wilson J begins his judgment by referring to religious conflicts from South Asia 
and their transplantation to the British scene as seen in Muslim-Hindu and Muslim-Sikh. 
While he may have perceived this as a relevant backdrop to his evaluation of the factual 
scenario, one may ask about the extent to which his decision really need have rested on 
these conflicts. It can be argued that this specifically British way of viewing South Asian 
pluralism has the unfortunate effect of exaggerating what Ballard (1996) has described, in 
the Punjabi context, as the ‘quamic’ elements of religiosity that emerged specifically as a 
reaction to British colonial policy in India. Elevation of these, effectively male-centered, 
qaumic elements has the side-effect of suppressing many more common elements of 
religiosity and world view among South Asians. Highlighting conflict among these 
groups enables the white judge to then place himself above all this and thus appear as a 
neutral arbiter. If this judgment also carries the hallmark of ethno-centrism, then it does 
so in a much more subtle way, and this is a possible line of action in the future of the 
reluctantly-pluralising English legal system. Whether this will be in interest of the groups 
concerned, and whether it will successfully contribute to building sustainable pluralism, 
remains open to question.  
Whether this decision, or at least its more positive features, ends up as a mere 
flash in a pan, or as a limited concession in line with the more general tendency of 
approaching ethnic minority laws within the English legal system, or whether it will have 
a lasting significance is difficult to estimate at this stage. Given the firm resistance to 
seeing the pluralisation of the official legal system, observers will not want to be too 
sanguine about it relevance. Were it not for the combination of circumstances in this 
case, including its factual situation, the strategy pursued by the lawyers, and some 
sympathy from the judge, this case could have easily looked quite different. Yet, one can 
also wonder how far avoidance strategies are a real option for judges anymore given the 
rapid pluralisation of the British social order. For Bangladeshis, meanwhile, life under 
English law, with its in-built superiority complex, will remain difficult.  
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Glossary of terms 
 
angrezi shariat British Muslim law, here interpreted as the living law among Muslims, so 
not confined to textual/doctrinal sources (Menski in Pearl and Menksi 
1998), ingreji shoriyot in Bangla/Sylheti 
bidesh  abroad, foreign country 
desh bidesh a home abroad or a home from home (Bangla, from Gardner 1993) 
desh pardesh a home abroad or a home from home (Panjabi, Urdu, Gujarati, Hindi, 
from Ballard 1994) 
desh  country/home 
kagzi of paper (literally, Urdu), here meant to signify ‘bureaucratic’, as in ‘kagzi 
raj’ 
quamic capacity of religious ideas and loyalties to act as a vehicle for ethno-
political mobilisation (Ballard 1996) 
rivaz custom, rules of appropriate behaviour within a family or community 
context (Ballard n.d.), rewaj in Bangla/Sylheti 
shari’a Muslim law (but here qualified to also indicate textual or doctrinal 
sources of this law) 
zina  illicit sex, jina in Bangla/Sylheti 
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